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REGULATORY FRONTIERS 
Integrating Social and Ethical Concerns 
Into Regulatory Decision-Making for 
Emerging Technologies 
Gary Marchant, Ann Meyer & Megan Scanlon* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many emerging technologies—including advances in 
genetic medicine, animal and plant biotechnology, 
nanotechnology, stem cells, robotics, synthetic biology, and 
neuroscience—raise important ethical and social issues. These 
issues are intensively debated in a variety of contexts by 
stakeholders, scholars, and the researchers themselves during 
the research stage of technology development. Discussion 
appears in academic research projects and publications; 
regional, national and international conferences; professional 
associations; Congressional debates and reports; and 
governmental advisory bodies such as the President’s Council 
on Bioethics, the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society, or 
the HHS Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human Research 
Protections. With a few relatively narrow exceptions for 
requirements such as human subjects protection,1 however, the 
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 1. While Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) are required to review most 
research involving human subjects, IRBs are expressly prohibited from 
considering the longer-term ethical implications of proposed research. 45 
C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) (2008) (“The IRB should not consider possible long-range 
effects of applying knowledge gained in the research (for example, the possible 
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impact of these debates on the direction and performance of 
research is primarily hortatory and voluntary, with few 
mandatory legal requirements or restrictions relating to ethical 
and social concerns imposed at the research stage. 
Ethical and social concerns may also animate market 
forces in the form of consumer demands, as well as objections 
once the technologies are commercialized. But between the 
research and commercialization stages in the development of 
emerging technologies, the regulatory-approval step provides 
perhaps the best opportunity to expressly and formally consider 
the ethical and social impacts of new technologies. Yet, when 
confronted with making regulatory decisions that raise such 
ethical and social concerns, federal regulatory agencies often 
seem prevented by legal and practical restraints from 
addressing those very issues. 
This article considers the issue of whether and how 
regulatory agencies should give more express consideration to 
the ethical and social impacts of technologies they regulate. 
Part II demonstrates that current practice and law generally 
exclude the explicit and open consideration of ethical and social 
issues. Part III sets forth the arguments for giving greater 
weight to those issues in regulatory decision-making. Part IV 
raises some potential concerns and pitfalls associated with 
giving more express consideration to ethical and social 
implications. Finally, Part V evaluates two potential models for 
more explicitly incorporating ethical and social concerns into 
regulatory decision-making. 
II.  EXCLUSION OF ETHICAL AND SOCIAL CONCERNS IN 
CURRENT PRACTICE 
While current U.S. regulatory regimes usually address 
issues such as costs and impacts on health, safety, and the 
environment, such regimes are generally structured to ignore 
the social and ethical issues that arise in response to emerging 
technologies. Yet, the concerns expressed by many members of 
the public tend to be centered in the ethical and social realms, 
whether presented as the “yuck” factor or repugnance in 
response to technological developments that cause discomfort 
or unease, or in more concrete and articulated moral or societal 
                                                          
effects of the research on public policy) as among those research risks that fall 
within the purview of its responsibility.”). 
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concerns.2 Examples of such concerns include the distributional 
impacts of new technologies, their potential use for enhancing 
humans, the “unnatural” nature of some of the interventions 
made possible by new technologies, and the commoditization or 
destruction of human or animal “life,” however defined.3 
A recent example of a regulatory agency’s inability and 
failure to address the public’s social and ethical concerns is the 
decision by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to 
approve the marketing of milk and meat from cloned animals.4 
Thousands of members of the public took the time to prepare 
and submit comments to the FDA raising social and ethical 
concerns about the FDA’s proposed decision on cloned animals.5 
While the substantive merits of these comments are certainly 
debatable, the FDA refused to engage the issues altogether, 
instead dismissing such claims with a cursory statement that 
“the agency has not been charged with addressing moral, 
religious, or ethical issues associated with animal cloning . . . .”6 
Yet, a public opinion poll found that 63% of respondents felt 
(53% felt strongly) that “[g]overnment regulators should 
                                                          
 2. E.g., Kristen Kulinowski, Nanotechnology: From “Wow” to “Yuck”?, 24 
BULL. SCI. TECH. & SOC’Y 13, 17 (2004); Leon R. Kass, Defending Human 
Dignity, COMMENTARY, Dec. 2007, at 53, 54; Editorial, Beyond the Yuck 
Factor, NEW SCIENTIST, June 25, 2005, at 5, 5. 
 3. See, e.g., Anne Chapman, Genetic Engineering: The Unnatural 
Argument, 9 TECHNÉ 81, 8192 (2005) (arguing that genetic engineering is 
unnatural and hence morally suspect); Kass, supra note 2, at 54 (discussing 
nanomechanical implants that enhance sensation or motor skills and the 
emerging science of producing man-machine hybrids). 
 4. See generally John F. Murphy, Mandatory Labeling of Food Made 
From Cloned Animals: Grappling with Moral Objections to the Production of 
Safe Products, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 131 (2008) (recounting the origins of 
cloned food, the FDA’s decision to approve products from cloned animals as 
safe, and the legislative response to the FDA’s decision). 
 5. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA’S RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENT ON 
THE ANIMAL CLONING RISK ASSESSMENT, RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN, AND 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, 
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/AnimalCloning/ucm05549
1.htm [hereinafter U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN] (stating that the FDA received 
approximately 30,500 comments); see also Rick Weiss, FDA is Set to Approve 
Milk, Meat from Clones, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2006, at A1 (noting that surveys 
showed that 60 percent of the U.S. population was uncomfortable with the 
idea of cloning animals for milk and food); Zahra Meghani & Immaculada de 
Melo-Martin, The U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s Evaluation of the 
Safety of Animal Clones: A Failure to Recognize the Normativity of Risk 
Assessment Projects, 29 BULL. OF SCI. TECH. & SOC’Y 9, 9 (2009) (questioning 
the FDA’s stated mission and the adequacy of the public comment process). 
 6. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 5, at 4. 
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include ethical and moral considerations, in addition to 
scientific evaluation of risks and benefits, when making 
regulatory decisions about cloning or genetically modifying 
animals.”7 
The FDA’s refusal to consider such concerns is undoubtedly 
correct in a legal sense. Congress charged the agency only with 
ensuring that products are “safe” and “effective,”8 criteria that 
do not seem to incorporate broader ethical or social concerns. 
Nonetheless, it is problematic to dismiss as “out-of-bounds” the 
deeply-felt views of many Americans who comment on a 
proposed government action simply because their concerns are 
outside the agency’s stated mission. 
Many other examples of this problem exist. The approval of 
drugs such as human growth hormone that have enhancement 
as well as therapeutic applications proceeds without significant 
consideration of the ethical concerns, and despite many 
concerns among experts and the public about potential misuse 
for enhancement purposes.9 As the number of available drugs 
addressing cognitive performance (e.g., Alzheimer’s treatments) 
is expected to expand over the next decade,10 the inability of 
FDA to consider factors other than safety and efficacy will 
become increasingly problematic and limiting. Similarly, much 
of the opposition to genetically modified crops and foods is 
based on ethical, social, and religious concerns,11 yet regulatory 
agencies including the FDA, U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have not 
given any explicit consideration or weight to such concerns.12 
                                                          
 7. Memorandum from the Mellman Group to the Pew Initiative on Food 
and Biotechnology, Recent Findings, at 7 (Nov. 7, 2005), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/News/Press_Releas
es/Food_and_Biotechnology/PIFB_Public_Sentiment_GM_Foods2005.pdf. 
 8. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 393(b) (2009). 
 9. See, e.g., Dov Fox, Safety, Efficacy, and Authenticity: The Gap Between 
Ethics and Law in FDA Decisionmaking, MICH. ST. L. REV. 1135, 1159-60 
(2005). 
 10. See Robert E. Becker & Nigel H. Greig, Alzheimer’s Disease Drug 
Development in 2008 and Beyond: Problems and Opportunities, 5 CURRENT 
ALZHEIMER RES. 346, 346–47, 356 (2008). 
 11. Lynn Frewer et al., Societal Aspects of Genetically Modified Foods, 42 
FOOD & CHEMICAL TOXICOLOGY 1181, 1183 (2004); Immaculada de Melo-
Martin & Zahra Meghani, Beyond Risk, 9 EMBO REP. 302, 302 (2008). 
 12. Melo-Martin & Meghani, supra note 11, at 305. 
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III.  THE CASE FOR INCLUSION OF SOCIAL AND 
ETHICAL CONCERNS 
As the ethical and social issues raised by new biomedical 
and other emerging technologies continue to expand in the 
future with growth in the capabilities and power of new 
technologies, the current inability to consider ethical and social 
issues in the context of regulatory decision-making will become 
increasingly problematic. To be sure, there are other social 
mechanisms including governmental ethics advisory bodies, 
scholarly and public deliberations, and the new focus on 
upstream engagement, available to address the social and 
ethical impacts of new technologies.13 Notwithstanding such 
forums and mechanisms, there remains a problem when ethical 
or social issues are raised (often by the public) in specific 
rulemaking proceedings, as agencies often lack the legal 
jurisdiction or political wherewithal to respond on the merits. 
Given that many of the public concerns about such technologies 
are ethical or social in nature, it seems inappropriate from both 
a normative and instrumental perspective for regulatory 
agencies to continue to disregard such concerns because they 
are outside of their stated regulatory missions. 
The straightforward normative argument for regulatory 
agency consideration of social concerns is that in a democratic 
society, citizens should have the right to comment on whatever 
issues concern them regarding government decisions. Moral 
and social concerns are often deeply-felt and strongly-held by 
many members of society, and in their perception such issues 
cannot be divorced from the scientific, economic, and other 
policy issues that regulatory agencies do consider.14 Thus, in a 
democracy, citizens should have the right to raise moral and 
social concerns about a proposed government action, and to 
have those concerns considered and addressed by government 
decision-makers.15 
                                                          
 13. See JAMES WILSDON & REBECCA WILLIS, SEE-THROUGH SCIENCE: 
WHY PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT NEEDS TO MOVE UPSTREAM (2004); Tee Rogers-
Hayden & Nick Pidgeon, Moving Engagement “Upstream”? Nanotechnologies 
and the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering’s Inquiry, 16 PUBLIC 
UNDERSTANDING SCI. 345 (2007). 
 14. See Sheila Jasanoff, Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in 
Governing Science, 41 MINERVA 223, 243 (2003) (arguing that public discussion 
of science and technology should include ethical analysis). 
 15. See Marcy Darnovsky, Political Science, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2009, 
at 36, 37, available at http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/13/Darnovsky.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2010). 
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There is also an instrumental value to agencies expressly 
considering ethical and social concerns raised by the public. 
The public is much more likely to accept a government decision 
if its views have been accorded respect and consideration, even 
when they do not agree with the ultimate decision 
substantively, than if the government does not provide an 
opportunity to air and consider those dissenting views.16 Thus, 
regardless of the ultimate outcome of the decision-making 
process, government decisions will be more credible if 
regulators expressly consider the ethical and social issues that 
concern members of the public.17 
An additional instrumental argument is that ethical and 
social issues are so central to decisions on many emerging 
technologies that if they are not addressed explicitly, they will 
inevitably be addressed implicitly or covertly. An example is 
the recent FDA debacle over the Plan B emergency 
contraceptive, where ethical and social concerns appeared to 
motivate the agency’s reluctance to approve the product for 
over-the-counter availability, yet the agency declined to be 
explicit about these concerns and instead tried to camouflage 
its decision on scientific and policy grounds that it perceived 
were more legitimate.18 This ruse fooled no one–not the critics, 
the media, Congress, or even scientists within the agency. The 
FDA’s recalcitrance to approve the product was eventually 
struck down by a federal court on the grounds of improper 
decision-making criteria and procedure.19 The entire incident 
left a blemish on the agency’s credibility and reputation.20 
A final instrumental argument is that if the public’s ethical 
and social concerns are not addressed now, those concerns will 
fester and build up over time until they burst forth with 
potentially devastating consequences for the scientific and 
technological enterprise. As Leon Kass warned almost forty 
years ago: “If attempts are not made early to detect and 
diminish the social costs of biomedical advances by intelligent 
                                                          
 16. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING 
DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 81–82 (Paul C. Stern & Harvey V. 
Fineberg eds., 1996). 
 17. Frewer et al., supra note 11, at 1190. 
 18. See id. at 392–94. 
 19. Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 547–48, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 20. See Frank Davidoff, Sex, Politics and Morality at the FDA: Reflections 
on the Plan B Decision, HASTINGS CENTER REP., March 2006, at 20, 24–25. 
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institutional regulation, the society is likely to react later with 
more sweeping, immoderate, and throttling controls.”21 We may 
already be experiencing the first waves of such pent-up public 
frustrations as a result of past failures to adequately address 
the public’s concerns. Those concerns, and the potentially 
devastating long-term consequences of ignoring them, will 
expand dramatically with the growing impact and 
intrusiveness of emerging technologies. 
In short, for both normative and instrumental reasons, 
there is a strong presumptive case for allowing agencies to give 
express consideration to ethical and social concerns in 
regulatory decisions. 
IV. CONCERNS ABOUT INCORPORATING ETHICAL AND 
SOCIAL ISSUES 
There are some reasons to be cautious about explicitly 
incorporating ethical and social issues into regulatory decision-
making. Unlike safety and efficacy, where people can fairly 
easily reach consensus on what is a good or bad result (e.g., 
causing tumors is bad), there is more room for disagreement on 
what is a good or bad moral or social effect.22 For example, 
people may disagree on whether the alleged impact of genetic 
engineering in promoting the consolidation of small family 
farms into larger, more efficient industrial farms is a favorable 
or unfavorable outcome.23 In the same vein, social and ethical 
risks are more intangible, as well as harder to define and 
quantify, and thus do not lend themselves to the same type of 
quantitative analyses and validation that are common for 
safety or efficacy determinations by regulatory agencies.24 
                                                          
 21. Leon R. Kass, The New Biology: What Price Relieving Man’s Estate?, 
174 SCI. 779, 787 (1971). 
 22. See Harold T. Shapiro, Reflections on the Interface of Bioethics, Public 
Policy, and Science, 9 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 209, 209 (1999) (“[W]e 
continue to lack a moral consensus on some of the most profound ethical 
claims that some believe ought to be more fully reflected in actual public 
policies.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Daniel Lee Kleinman et al., Local Variation or Global 
Convergence in Agricultural Biotechnology Policy? A Comparative Analysis, 36 
SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 361, 365 (2009). 
 24. Such factors produce trepidation about the government wading into 
ethical and moral issues. Thus, in one poll, approximately two-thirds of 
respondents favored basing governmental regulatory decisions on scientific 
factors alone, while only one-third favored decisions based on ethical and 
social concerns. George Gaskell et al., Social Values and the Governance of 
Science, 310 SCI. 1908, 1908 (2005). As the authors of this study note, 
MARCHANT (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010 11:42 AM 
352 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 11:1 
 
 
Finally, ethical and social views are not fixed in time, but tend 
to shift rapidly with changes in technological capabilities and 
other societal factors.25 
Other problems also justify caution in making regulatory 
agencies the arbiters of moral correctness. The professional 
staff of regulatory agencies consists primarily of scientists, 
engineers, economists, and attorneys. Should these agencies be 
staffed much more heavily with ethicists, social scientists, and, 
perhaps, even theologians? Would we accept such a government 
agency explicitly making moral and social decisions about 
products such as the Plan B emergency contraceptive, 
especially when the outcome might shift dramatically with a 
change in administration?26 Given that ethical and moral 
concerns are closely tied to religious beliefs for many people, 
might allowing explicit moral and social decisions create a risk 
of violating the First Amendment’s required separation of 
church and state? Finally, regulatory agency officials have 
expressed concern that requiring express consideration of 
moral and ethical issues in regulatory actions would jeopardize 
the perceived scientific basis and credibility of their decisions.27 
Given the intangible and subjective nature of ethical and 
social concerns, there is also a risk that government agencies 
empowered to consider such concerns might publicly justify 
regulatory decisions based on such factors, when protectionist 
or other improper motives are the true rationale for the 
decision.28 For example, several European Union (EU) member 
                                                          
however, alienating the significant minority who favor consideration of ethical 
and social implications could adversely affect overall societal trust in new 
technologies. Id. at 1909. 
 25. See Shapiro, supra note 22, at 210. 
 26. See Jonathan D. Rockoff, Critics Weigh in on FDA’s Decisions: Some 
Say Ethics, Finances Should be Factors for Product Approval, BALTIMORE 
SUN, Jan. 9, 2006 (quoting bioethicist Daniel Callahan opposing giving 
agencies such as FDA authority to consider moral considerations in regulatory 
decisions because “[a]ny solutions would, I think, reflect the position of the 
party in power.”). 
 27. See id. (citing the argument of a former FDA official that “the agency’s 
hard-won credibility would suffer if it abandoned its scientific focus”). 
 28. See LINDA NIELSEN & BERIT A. FABER, NAT’L CONSUMER AGENCY OF 
DENMARK, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES IN EUROPEAN REGULATION OF 
BIOTECHNOLOGY – POSSIBILITIES AND PITFALLS 22 (2002) (“Since ethical 
concerns are difficult to document and might be perceived as a paving the way 
for ulterior national interests . . . it is difficult to take account of these 
concerns.”). 
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states recently proposed that the EU regulatory approach to 
GM foods should be revised to allow a member state to ban or 
restrict genetically modified (GM) foods based on factors such 
as social-economic and moral objections of the public.29 While 
many EU citizens have genuine social and moral objections, 
public opinion studies show that the primary concern is that 
GM foods are unsafe.30 Yet, every major scientific organization 
that has addressed the issue, including the EU’s own scientific 
advisors, has concluded that GM foods are as safe, if not safer, 
than conventional non-GM foods.31 Thus, ethical and social 
concerns could act as a Trojan horse used to hide invalid or 
inappropriate rationales that cannot stand up to public 
scrutiny but which are nevertheless the true drivers of a 
regulatory decision. 
V. NEW APPROACHES FOR CONSIDERING ETHICAL 
AND SOCIAL CONCERNS 
The concerns described in the previous section suggest that 
it might be problematic to give regulatory agencies direct and 
express authority to make ethical or social judgments about 
emerging technologies. On the other hand, it may be even more 
objectionable to avoid these ethical and social considerations 
altogether. Innovative new mechanisms or approaches are 
needed to incorporate ethical and social concerns into 
regulatory decisions on emerging technologies. Concurring in 
this view, the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetic 
                                                          
 29. Memorandum from the General Secretariat, Council of Europe to the 
Delegations, Annex (June 24, 2009), available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st11/st11226-re02.en09.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2010). 
 30. See, e.g., Montserrat Costa-Font et al., Consumer Acceptance, 
Valuation of and Attitudes Towards Genetically Modified Food: Review and 
Implications for Food Policy, 33 FOOD POL’Y 99, 107–108 (2008); Gunjan 
Sinha, Up in Arms, 27 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 592, 592–593 (2009). 
 31. See, e.g., European Commission, A Review of Results: EC-sponsored 
Research on Safety of Genetically Modified Organisms, 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/quality-of-life/gmo/index.html (compiling the 
results of over 80 European Commission-sponsored research projects on the 
safety of GM food); see also, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF TRANSGENIC PLANTS 49 (2002) (“the transgenic 
process presents no new categories of risk compared to conventional methods 
of crop improvement”); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REPORT IN BRIEF: 
SAFETY OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS (2004) (“Genetic engineering . . . 
poses no unique health risks that cannot also arise from conventional breeding 
and other genetic alteration methods.”). 
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Testing recommended in 2000 that: 
In the future, [genetic] tests may be developed that raise major social 
and ethical concerns. Because FDA’s review will focus on assuring the 
analytical and clinical validity of a test, the agency’s capacity to 
assess the ethical and social implications of a test may not be 
sufficient. The Secretary should consider the development of a 
mechanism to ensure the identification and appropriate review of 
tests that raise major social and ethical concerns.32 
Another group of experts likewise endorsed the creation of 
mechanisms to explicitly consider the public’s social and ethical 
concerns: 
[I]t is becoming very apparent that institutional transparency, 
coupled with the integration of public concerns into policy 
development and implementation, will facilitate the introduction of 
emerging technologies and their applications . . . into society. In order 
that this strategy might be successful, it is important to understand 
what is driving public concern, and to integrate this into policy 
development rather than dismiss it as irrational as has sometimes 
happened in the past.33 
In designing mechanisms to better analyze and deliberate 
on the moral and social dimensions of proposed regulatory 
decisions, we must recognize that in the morally pluralistic 
society in which live, consensus on these issues is highly 
unlikely.34 Thus, the goal should not be to make any final 
decision on these ethical and social issues, but to provide a 
process whereby differing perspectives and interests can be 
presented, discussed, and considered in a transparent and 
explicit manner. 
What might a new institutional approach look like? In the 
remainder of this paper, we consider two possible models: (1) 
the requirement for an ethical impact statement to accompany 
regulations, and (2) the creation of an ethics review board to 
review specific regulatory decisions. As analysis of real-world 
examples will show, both models allow more explicit and formal 
consideration of ethical and social issues in regulatory decision-
                                                          
 32. Public Comments on Preliminary Final Recommendations on 
Oversight of Genetic Testing, 65 FED. REG. 21,094, 21,095 (July 2000); see also 
Kass, supra note 21, at 787 (“Concepts of ‘risk’ and ‘cost’ need to be broadened 
to include . . . social and ethical consequences.”). 
 33. Frewer et al., supra note 11, at 1191. 
 34. See Lonneke Poort, Consensus or Dissensus in the Legislative 
Approach to Complex Policy Problems?: Animal Biotechnology as an Example 
15 (Tilburg Working Paper Series on Jurisprudence and Legal History, No. 08-
03, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1284924. 
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making. 
A.  ETHICAL IMPACT STATEMENT 
A regulatory agency could be required to issue an “Ethical 
Impact Statement” (“EthIS”) to accompany any significant 
regulatory decisions. This EthIS would have to identify and 
evaluate the ethical and social impacts of the agency’s proposed 
decision and the efforts (if any) the agency was undertaking to 
mitigate those impacts. This model is analogous to the 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that federal agencies 
must issue under the National Environmental Policy Act 
(“NEPA”) for any federal actions that will significantly affect 
the human environment.35 Although NEPA does not have any 
substantive impact in terms of limiting or directing an agency’s 
decision,36 it does have a beneficial impact in forcing the agency 
to be aware of the environmental impacts of its actions, and 
informing the public of those impacts.37 An EthIS could operate 
                                                          
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006). Various types of other impact statements are 
required in other contexts, primarily in jurisdictions outside the United 
States, which provide additional bodies of empirical evidence that could also 
be used as models for an ethical impact statement. See, e.g., Roger Clarke, 
Privacy Impact Assessment: Its Origins and Development, 25 COMPUTER L. & 
SECURITY REV. 123, 123 (2009) (discussing privacy impact assessments); Janet 
Collins & Jeffrey P. Koplan, Health Impact Assessment: A Step Toward Health 
in All Policies, 302 JAMA315, 315 (2009). (discussing proposals for health 
impact assessments “to examine the effects that a policy, program, or project 
may have on the health of a population”); Elin Palm & Sven Ove Hansson, The 
Case for Ethical Technology Assessment (eTA), 73 TECHNOLOGICAL 
FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 543, 543–44 (2006) (proposing requirement for 
an ethical technology assessment). 
 36. Marsh v. Ore. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989) (“NEPA 
does not work by mandating that agencies achieve particular substantive 
environmental results.”). 
 37. See Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 
754, 758 (9th Cir. 1996) (“NEPA’s goal is satisfied once . . . information is 
properly disclosed; thus, NEPA exists to ensure a process, not to ensure any 
result.”); see also James M. McElfish, Jr., NEPA and Liberty, Now and 
Forever, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10629, 10629 (2009) (“The result of these 
procedures is that alternatives are considered that the government would not 
have identified on its own, that data are discovered that the government 
would not have otherwise identified, and that environmental issues are 
studied that the government would not have identified or studied. Bad 
decisions are sometimes avoided and good decisions made even better. 
Mitigation measures are identified; some of them are even adopted.”). Despite 
its many positive impacts, the NEPA EIS requirements has been criticized for 
the amount of time and resources needed to complete an assessment, the low 
quality of information and analysis often included, and the “ritualization” of 
the process within agencies, stimulated by a desire to make litigation-proof 
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in a similar manner with respect to a regulation’s ethical 
implications. 
Another precedent for an EthIS is the World Bank’s 
requirement for a Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (“PSIA”). 
The origins of the PSIA can be traced back to the 1995 World 
Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, which adopted 
the Declaration on Social Development.38 As subsequently 
articulated by the World Bank, the new approach to social 
policy outlined by the Declaration involved a “political, 
economic, ethical and spiritual vision [that is] based on human 
dignity, human rights, equality, respect, peace, democracy, 
mutual responsibility and cooperation, and full respect for the 
various religions and ethical values and cultural backgrounds 
of people.”39 This represented a significant broadening of the 
Bank’s decision-making criteria beyond traditional economic 
considerations. By the end of the 1990s, the World Bank had 
revised its social development strategy to more explicitly 
consider and give more weight to social norms, values, and 
institutions, using “a holistic approach” that replaced the 
Bank’s fixation on increasing income.40 One mechanism 
adopted for implementing this strategy was a requirement to 
conduct a PSIA of proposed policy reforms.41 
A PSIA utilizes a multidisciplinary approach, integrating 
both social and economic analytical tools, to perform an ex-ante 
analysis of the social impacts of proposed policy reforms.42 A 
                                                          
decisions. See generally Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: 
Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 903, 91723 (2002). 
 38. See Antje Vetterlein, Economic Growth, Poverty Reduction, and the 
Role of Social Policies: The Evolution of the World Bank’s Social Development 
Approach, 13 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 513, 527 (2007); see also SOC. DEV. DEP’T, 
WORLD BANK, PAPER NO. 27, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT UPDATE: MAKING 
DEVELOPMENT MORE INCLUSIVE AND EFFECTIVE 1 (1998). 
 39. Vetterlein, supra note 38, at 527. 
 40. Id. at 518. 
 41. See id. at 528. 
 42. See INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., WORLD BANK, A USER’S 
GUIDE TO POVERTY AND SOCIAL IMPACT ANALYSIS 1 (2003), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTTOPPSISOU/Resources/1424002-
1185304794278/4026035-
1185386760315/PSIA_English.pdf?resourceurlname=PSIA_English.pdf 
[hereinafter PSIA USER’S GUIDE]. Although there is no fixed template for 
analyzing the poverty and social impacts of policy, “it is possible to identify a 
number of elements that make for good-practice PSIA.” Id. at 9. The ten 
elements of a PSIA are: (1) asking the right questions, (2) identifying 
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successful PSIA tends to have four characteristics: (1) it helps 
to promote the use of a wider range of evidence in policy 
making; (2) it “increases the extent to which distributional 
equity is considered in the policy process by ensuring that 
policies are not judged purely on aggregate economic efficiency 
grounds,”; (3) it combines analysis with process to understand 
and manage the political economy of reform, and (4) it 
“supports inclusive policy making by providing evidence with 
which policy makers and other stakeholders can inform their 
discussions through existing or emerging policy processes.”43 
An effective PSIA, thus, has two major impacts. First, it 
informs policymakers about the likely societal implications of 
different policy options to facilitate better and more socially-
conscious decision-making. Second, it informs and mobilizes 
various constituencies in the affected jurisdiction with respect 
to the probable social impacts of policy interventions, thereby 
empowering such constituencies to engage with and influence 
the policy-making process. For this to occur, it is important 
that the information in the PSIA be collected and 
communicated in a transparent manner, and opportunities be 
afforded to stakeholders to participate in the policy-making 
process.44 
Identifying and engaging stakeholders early in the process 
of a PSIA is essential to its success. The World Bank PSIA 
procedure therefore calls for a “stakeholder analysis” to identify 
“people, groups, and organizations that are important to take 
                                                          
stakeholders, (3) understanding transmission channels, (4) assessing 
institutions, (5) gathering data and information, (6) analyzing impacts, (7) 
contemplating enhancement and compensation measures, (8) assessing risks, 
(9) monitoring and evaluating impacts, and (10) fostering policy debate and 
feeding back into policy choice. Id. 
 43. JEREMY HOLLAND, TOOLS FOR INSTITUTIONAL, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL 
ANALYSIS OF POLICY REFORM 11 (2007). 
 44. INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., WORLD BANK, GOOD 
PRACTICE NOTE: USING POVERTY AND SOCIAL IMPACT ANALYSIS TO SUPPORT 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY OPERATIONS 17–20 (2008), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPSIA/Resources/GPN_August08_final.p
df [hereinafter GOOD PRACTICE NOTE]; see also PSIA USER’S GUIDE, supra 
note 42, at 35. (“One way to approach this is to disseminate information about 
the proposed reform and the results of the PSIA to the public, especially to key 
stakeholders, and then to organize a policy forum where stakeholders can 
discuss the tradeoffs involved. . . . Insights gained through dialogue may be 
technical (for example, academic research) or social (for example, the 
perspectives and concerns of groups that typically do not participate in the 
formal policy debate process.”). 
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into account.”45 The World Bank PSIA User’s Guide advises 
splitting stakeholders into two primary groups, the first being 
beneficiaries and those who suffer adverse impacts, and the 
second consisting of organized groups such as unions, business 
associations, donors, and civil society organizations.46 Once the 
groups are identified, stakeholder analysis is used, going 
beyond analyzing the interests of actors in relation to a policy 
to requiring “key informant interviews” to evaluate interests, 
and engaging appropriate stakeholders in the policy-making 
process.47 The Bank also recognizes that the interests of 
stakeholders who are less organized or lacking representation 
may require the use of special surveys or focus groups.48 For 
example, in Sri Lanka, a stakeholder analysis of the PSIA on 
land reform showed that “groups likely to be affected by the 
reform had not yet been consulted nor the impacts they would 
face considered. By identifying these previously overlooked 
stakeholder groups, the PSIA enabled their integration into a 
facilitated consultation process around the reform proposal.”49 
The PSIA requirements appear to have been successful in 
promoting greater explicit consideration of social and ethical 
impacts of World Bank decisions. For example, PSIA findings 
regarding the social impacts of land and fertilizer reform in 
Zambia sparked public debate among stakeholders.50 
Eventually, PSIA disclosure and discussions led to broader 
reforms in support of the land programs, including improved 
road access, especially in remote areas, greater access to 
fertilizer and functioning agricultural extension services.51 The 
end result was that “[t]he PSIA seems to have had a major 
impact on rethinking the need for and speed of a land reform of 
the kind proposed by the government. Enough evidence was 
produced through the PSIA analysis to lead policymakers to 
                                                          
 45. PSIA USER’S GUIDE, supra note 42, at 10. 
 46. Id. at 11. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. GOOD PRACTICE NOTE, supra note 44, at 15. 
 50. INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., WORLD BANK, TOOLS 
FOR INSTITUTIONAL, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS OF POLICY REFORM: A 
SOURCEBOOK FOR DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS OR TIPS 38, 87–88 (2007), 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVEL
OPMENT/EXTTOPPSISOU/0,,menuPK:1424015~pagePK:64168427~piPK:641
68435~theSitePK:1424003,00.html (hereinafter TIPS SOURCEBOOK). 
 51. Id. at 89. 
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rethink the necessity of such a comprehensive reform.”52 
Both the EIS and PSIA examples demonstrate the 
potential impact that a requirement for an analysis of 
otherwise neglected or under-emphasized dimensions of a 
decision can have in promoting greater awareness and 
emphasis on those issues in decision-making. A requirement for 
an agency to study and discuss the ethical and social impacts of 
its regulatory decisions could bring greater scrutiny to such 
issues. The EIS and PSIA examples demonstrate the need for 
transparency, outreach, and public engagement to ensure full 
ventilation of the ethical and social concerns of all sectors of 
society in an EthIS. 
Such an approach would also have its limitations. A 
requirement to study and describe the ethical impacts would 
not necessarily ensure that those factors are appropriately 
incorporated into actual decisions. One major criticism of 
NEPA is that it is only procedural and does not directly affect 
the substance of regulatory decisions.53 Another issue in the 
implementation of such a requirement would be the need for 
some type of threshold and guidance criteria for when an EthIS 
would be required and how much detail would be required.54 
Many regulatory decisions may raise few, if any, ethical and 
social issues, while other decisions may raise substantial 
ethical and social concerns. A requirement for EthISs would 
need a way to distinguish these situations through some sort of 
threshold or tiered approach. 
B.  ETHICS REVIEW BOARD 
A second potential model would be to create an ethics 
review board (“ERB”) to evaluate and provide recommendations 
regarding the ethical aspects of specific agency proposals. The 
ERB could be situated within each agency, or could be 
government-wide and centralized in the White House. Most 
federal regulatory agencies already have similar advisory 
committees to provide scientific advice; the proposed Ethics 
                                                          
 52. Id. 
 53. See Matthew J. Lindstrom, Procedures Without Purpose: The 
Withering Away of the National Environmental Policy Act’s Substantive Law, 
20 J. LAND RESOURCES ENVTL L. 245 (2000). 
 54. For example, NEPA limits the application of the requirement to 
prepare a full Environmental Impact Statement to only those government 
actions “significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000). 
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Review Board would provide comparable advice on the ethical 
and social dimensions of the agency’s actions. An ERB outside 
of the agency might have greater independence and credibility 
by being immune from any real or perceived control or 
influence by the agency making the regulatory decision. It 
would also promote consistency across federal agencies. 
A centralized ERB would differ from existing structures 
such as the President’s Council on Bioethics in that, instead of 
considering ethical issues associated with biomedical 
technologies in general,55 the ERB would review the ethical and 
social dimensions of specific proposed regulatory actions by 
agencies. One possible analogy to this review authority is the 
Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which conducts an independent 
review of the economic analyses underlying proposed and final 
substantial regulatory decisions by agencies.56 
A precedent for a centralized ethical review body is 
provided by the European Group on Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies (EGE). This entity was originally constituted in 
1991 as the Group of Advisers on the Ethical Implications of 
Biotechnology (GAEIB), composed of six experts drawn from 
law, science, medicine, philosophy, and theology.57 The group 
and its responsibilities have continually expanded since its 
creation.58 When the GAEIB’s mandate expired in 1997, the 
European Commission replaced the group with the EGE.59 The 
Commission enlarged the group to twelve members, and the 
term for individual members was extended to from two to three 
years.60 In 2005, it was further enlarged to fifteen members.61 
EGE members are appointed by the E.U. Commission, and 
include professors of philosophy, theology, medical and health 
                                                          
 55. Exec. Order No. 13,237, 3 C.F.R. 821 (2001), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 14 
app. 2 (2006). 
 56. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 FED. REG. 51,735 (1993); see also Office of 
Management and Budget, Information and Regulatory Affairs, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/regulatory_affairs/default/ (last visited Oct. 
22, 2009). 
 57. Helen Busby et al., Ethical EU Law? The Influence of the European 
Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, 33 EUR. L. REV. 803, 806 
(2008). 
 58. Id. at 806–807. 
 59. Id. at 806. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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care ethics, genetics and public health, clinical pharmacology, 
plant molecular genetics, food safety, information management, 
and law who currently serve five-year terms.62 The EGE and its 
predecessor, GAEIB, were created to address the perception 
that the European Commission lacked the resources, expertise, 
and authority to address the ethical implications of emerging 
technologies such as biotechnology.63 
There is no specific provision concerning ethics in the 
Treaty of Europe, the convention creating the EU and its 
various institutions and authorities.64 The EGE, therefore, 
operates with little or no statutory or other legal authority or 
requirements. The group creates its own rules for procedure.65 
It has considerable autonomy; members provide their own 
perspectives and judgments with no specific obligation to follow 
or adhere to EU policies or interests.66 
The EU Parliament and Council of Ministers may request 
Opinions of the EGE, but the EGE can also initiate its own 
opinions.67 The EGE is under a formal obligation to establish 
close links with Commission departments involved in the issue 
under consideration.68 The EGE has no other formal obligation 
to consult other institutional actors, stakeholders, or the public, 
although the EGE has established the practice of consulting 
with outside experts to inform and support its opinions.69 
Notwithstanding the perceived need for such a body to 
provide expertise in ethics on emerging technologies, the EGE 
has been subject to extensive debate regarding its legitimacy 
and democratic accountability. Because technical experts who 
make up the EGE and its various committees do not have any 
political or social responsibilities to elected representatives or 
EU citizens, their accountability is questionable.70 Despite 
these ongoing questions about the legitimacy of the EGE, it 
plays an influential role in EU law making and policy making. 
It serves to validate EU-level legislation, provides an 
interpretive reference point for policy, and serves as a forum for 
                                                          
 62. Id. at 806, 835–36. 
 63. See id. at 807–808. 
 64. See id. at 83738. 
 65. Id. at 839. 
 66. See id. at 838–39 
 67. See id. at 808, 839. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 805. 
MARCHANT (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010 11:42 AM 
362 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 11:1 
 
 
airing ethical concerns raised by various civil society 
constituencies.71 In all of these roles, the EGE must balance 
economic growth and public acceptance.72 Increasingly the role 
of the EGE is to mediate among the EU legislature and 
executive, stakeholders such as industry seeking to enhance 
the regulatory environment for the development of new 
biotechnologies, and the citizenry who are suspicious of the 
ethical adequacy of the regulatory environment.73 The courts, 
including the European Court of Human Rights, have relied on 
EGE opinions on such issues as ownership of unimplanted 
embryos.74 
The EGE is also influential in the adoption of EU 
Directives. For example, Directive 98/4475 regarding legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions was proposed in 1988, 
but not passed for ten years because of controversial ethical 
debates.76 The ethical principles outlined in EGE and GAEIB 
opinions are reflected in the Directive, and it names the EGE 
and acknowledges that their published opinions were taken 
into account.77 Other EGE opinions identify ethical criteria that 
should be considered in legislation, advocate for certain 
positions, or set agendas for policy and legislation.78 
EU directives not only reflect and endorse many EGE 
recommendations, but occasionally also cite EGE opinions, and 
state that additional opinions will be sought in the future.79 
Commission press releases note that EGE opinions are taken 
into consideration along with the EU Charter for Fundamental 
Rights and documents of the Council of Europe, placing the 
EGE on the same level as long-standing authoritative bodies.80 
The EGE’s recommendations are not always accepted, however, 
and some regulatory proposals may leave ethical concerns to 
                                                          
 71. See id. at 805, 837–39. 
 72. Id. at 834. 
 73. Id. at 835. 
 74. Aurora Plomer, The European Group on Ethics: Law, Politics and the 
Limits of Moral Integration in Europe, 14 EUR. L.J. 839, 839–40 (2008). 
 75. Council Directive 98/44, 1998 O.J. (L213) 13. 
 76. Busby, supra note 57, at 810. 
 77. Id. at 814. 
 78. See id. at 819. 
 79. See id. at 813–14. 
 80. Id. at 820. 
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the individual EU member states.81 
While the EGE has its limitations and controversies, it 
does demonstrate that an ethics review board can be effective 
in identifying, evaluating, and injecting into regulatory 
decisions the ethical and social dimensions of emerging 
technologies. The United States should consider adapting and 
adopting a similar body for injecting ethical and social concerns 
into regulatory decision-making.82 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Ethical and social issues are an inherent and unavoidable 
aspect of many emerging technologies that will be entering the 
regulatory pipeline over the next decade. Current regulatory 
schemes are unable to adequately consider the ethical and 
social concerns associated with such technologies. It is no 
longer politically sustainable to ignore these ethical and social 
concerns in regulatory decision-making, yet giving regulatory 
agencies direct authority to evaluate and decide ethical issues 
on their own is likely to over-extend their expertise and 
legitimacy. Two alternative possible models to facilitate 
attention to ethical and social issues are requiring an ethical 
impact statement or creating an ethics advisory board to 
identify, evaluate, and publicize the ethical and social 
implications of proposed regulatory decisions. Both models 
should be considered. 
 
                                                          
 81. Id. at 821. 
 82. It should be noted that this model does not directly engage the public 
to bring their social, ethical and religious concerns into the debate. Rather, the 
ethics body (whether it is the EU’s, EGE, or the ERB proposed here) would 
serve as a conduit for expressing such concerns in the regulatory context, even 
though the relationship with the public would only be indirect. 
